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Abstract 
This report presents the results of the desk study on the evaluation of risks to (personal) data protection as 
considered in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for Infrastructures and their service 
providers that leverage federated identity management (FIM) to connect research and collaboration users. 
Specifically, it considers personal data collected as a result of using the infrastructure (not any risks relating to 
the research data itself, which is a community responsibility) and provides guidance to the Infrastructures 
concerning Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) in the FIM context. The authors present 
recommendations to Research Communities for determining the necessity of formal DPIA and guidelines for its 
execution. 
This document does not constitute legal advice in any specific jurisdiction.
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 Introduction 
The Research and e-Infrastructures, in the course of their regular activities of providing 
services to the research community, will inevitably collect a variety of personal data: records 
of access to a compute service; the name (in whatever form) of the initiator of a transfer of 
personal data; a history and archive of past service usage to support accounting (and for 
determining exhaustion of any resource allocations to the user or research community); for 
justification of their own usage of resources if the service or infrastructure is open i.e. does 
not rely on ‘pay per use’. The majority of the data so collected by the infrastructure can – in a 
direct or indirect way – be linked to a person, and thus falls within the scope of the data 
protection regulations in Europe. 
The use of federated identity management (FIM) in itself already goes a long way in 
satisfying key principles of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [GDPR] e.g.: 
data minimisation - personal data provided about the user during authentication is already 
limited to necessary elements (attributes); data security - passwords never leave the identity 
provider of the user’s Home Organization. The “IdP-SP-Proxies” of the Blueprint Architecture 
allow limiting the incoming attributes to the “research and scholarship” set, which is basically 
the same set of attributes as would be released by the researcher simply sending an email. 
Yet still many FIM identity provider organisations are still hesitant to release attributes 
because of a perceived liability when releasing even a name, a unique identifier, and an 
email address for their researchers. The work on the GÉANT Data Protection Code of 
Conduct (“DPCoCo”) [DPCoCo] in the REFEDS community addresses this issue by allowing 
service providers and Infrastructure proxies to confirm explicit adherence to GDPR 
principles, thereby allowing relying FIM participants to have more trust in the service or 
infrastructure. Although elements of this framework still need to be resolved, it would – when 
adopted and appropriately endorsed by the European Data Protection Board – go a long 
way to make necessary attributes available to the Infrastructures and proxies. 
The DPCoCo, whilst acknowledging accounting as a requisite part of granting access to 
services and bringing community-managed personal attributes of users within its scope, 
does not address the fact that personal data collected by the infrastructure as part of its 
operation also results in ‘new’ personal data such as the association of the workflow usage 
data, network identifiers (IP addresses) or specific datasets that identify a person. In an 
ecosystem where infrastructures are interconnected (and where research infrastructures use 
each other’s as well as generic e-Infrastructure services from a catalogue in a dynamic way), 
such data may be shared between many different parties, who are all independent data 
controllers – each of them by itself determines both purpose and means of the processing. 
The most visible personal data collected by the Infrastructures as part of their operations is 
accounting data. Indeed, for managing cross-infrastructure resource allocations, the sharing 
of accounting data is necessary for enabling access to federated services in the ecosystem, 
as well as being ‘novel’ in the sense that correlated accounting data may reveal workflow 
usage and research operating patterns of the individual researchers. 
Sharing of accounting data between generic federated e-Infrastructures and homogeneous 
communities was studied and described in the (AARC1) guideline G016 [AARC-G016] 
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Recommendations on the exchange of personal data in accounting data sharing. That 
guideline deals with generic accounting information exchange and does not address intra-
community needs for accounting, e.g. based on community-specific authorisation attributes 
such as groups and roles. Extending these recommendations on the protection of personal 
data in sharing accounting data to more complex communities (with significant internal 
structure and with internal controls) requires two elements: (i) understanding the risks 
resulting from the processing of Infrastructure-generated personal data within a community, 
and (ii) understanding the extent to which the organisational structure of a (research) 
community itself has to be reflected in the exchange of (accounting) data generated by the 
Infrastructure (because distinct groups exist within the community and there is no single 
community manager responsible for all of the data). 
In this initial phase recommendation, we focus on the risk assessment for personal data 
processing for collaborative and research communities in the context of the GDPR. The 
GDPR recognises the concept of a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), which 
comprises both an assessment framework to determine whether a processing is likely to 
result in a high risk for individuals, as well as a methodology to assess what the impact could 
be if there is indeed such a high risk. However, the guidance from the European Data 
Protection Board (EDPB, until recently “WP29”) must be interpreted in the context of 
research and collaboration infrastructures that are already using FIM mechanisms (reducing 
the risk), have adopted the Blueprint Architecture IdP-SP-Proxy concept (which harmonises 
the attribute management, but encourages cross-domain services involving many data 
controllers and use of omnidirectional identifiers for individuals), and exchange (accounting) 
information that has been collected in many services as a result of the user’s actions. The 
resulting risk assessment, likely having many common elements between the 
Infrastructures, can thus be made easier for the research communities if the DPIA guidance 
is targeted specifically to research communities employing FIM. 
At the same time, it should be recognised that some of the basic principles highlighted in 
Opinion 248 (rev. 01) from the EDPB, even when the processing results in a high risk, may 
already have been addressed once the DPCoCo has been endorsed. Similarly, seeking the 
view of the data subjects (researchers) is a feasible route, especially for well-coordinated 
communities (keeping in mind that seeking a data subject’s viewpoint cannot be done by 
asking for consent at the time of processing). So, even when a DPIA is necessary for the 
processing (which in itself will depend much on the community involved), there may be 
sufficient commonality in the FIM Infrastructures and in the IdP-SP-Proxy operations to 
lighten the burden on the communities and Infrastructures. 
In this document, we put the above considerations into context by giving background on the 
current GDPR structure and its prevalent interpretation by the EDPB and the R&E data 
protection experts (including DPCoCo and the GÉANT Task Force on data protection), 
discuss the methodology of the Data Protection Impact Assessment, and give guidance 
within the context of federated infrastructures for collaborative research communities and 
Blueprint IdP-SP-Proxy operators on how to determine whether a DPIA is needed, and if so 
how to perform such an impact assessment. 
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 Data Protection Regime and the GDPR 
The General Data Protection Regulation “2016/679” (GDPR) was adopted on 27 April 2016 
and will come into effect on 25 May 2018. It has a profound impact, not only on society in 
general, but also specifically on international research and collaboration, where its global 
nature and the need for open science and sharing of resources present specific challenges. 
As stated in Article 3(1), the Regulation “applies to the processing of personal data in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, 
regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.” It not only applies to 
entities that are established in the EU, but also to organisations located outside of EU if they 
“offer goods or services” or “monitor the behaviour” of data subjects residing in the EU – and 
as a Regulation it has direct effect, requiring neither further ratification or implementation into 
national law. And Infrastructure Services, by definition, offer services to both European and 
global researchers – and collect personal data in the process of offering these services. 
The paper by Christopher Kuner entitled “International Organizations and the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation” [KUNER2018], presents a clear and short summary of the 
relevant GDPR provisions, with the main points logically grouped in the following way: 
1. The principle of lawful processing: Recital 39 and Articles 5(1) and 6 outline the legal 
basis for processing of personal data. 
2. The purpose specifications and limitation: Article 5(1) states that the purpose of 
processing must be visibly defined before it is started. 
3. Data quality: Article 5(1) states that the data must be removed if the processing is no 
longer taking place. Additionally, it outlines principles for processing like data 
minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity, and confidentiality. 
4. Fair processing: Data subjects must be informed before their data are being 
processed about the purpose of the processing and about the identity of the 
controller. These and further rights of the data subjects are outlined in the Articles 12-
22 
5. Accountability: In the Article 5(2) it is stated that active security and privacy measures 
for the protection of personal data must be implemented by the data controllers. 
Controllers are responsible for the compliance of the processing operations with the 
data protection law. Also, compliance with the provisions of the law should be 
demonstrable by the data controllers to the data subjects, data protection authorities, 
and general public. 
For the monitoring of the GDPR compliance and implementation, the European Data 
Protection Board (EDPB), comprised of the national regulatory authorities of the member 
states, will be established on May 25th, 2018. 
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 Data Protection Impact Assessment – 
DPIA 
The GDPR, much more than previous directives and legislation, places the data subject in a 
central position, and organisations processing personal data have to continuously consider 
the effect their actions and processing has on the people involved. A key mechanism in the 
GDPR is a “risk assessment”: the “Data Protection Impact Assessment” (DPIA) of Article 35. 
It is a favoured mechanism, and is also present e.g. in Directive 2016/680 on crime and 
prosecution data. Article 35 of the GDPR states that when the processing of personal data is 
“likely to result in high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”, the data controller 
must conduct an assessment of the impact of the previously envisaged processing on the 
protection of personal data. So while not always necessary, at least a basic risk assessment 
it needed, also in research and collaboration infrastructures, and here specifically for 
Infrastructure-generated data. 
This chapter presents the viewpoint of “WP29” (the future EDPB) expressed through its 
Opinions regarding DPIA, and the necessary steps and conditions involved with conducting 
a DPIA, i.e. Opinion WP 248 [WP29-248]. From the Opinion: 
A DPIA is a process designed to describe the processing, assess its necessity and 
proportionality and help manage the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons 
resulting from the processing of personal data by assessing them and determining the 
measures to address them. DPIAs are important tools for accountability, as they help 
controllers not only to comply with requirements of the GDPR, but also to demonstrate 
that appropriate measures have been taken to ensure compliance with the Regulation 
(see also article 24). In other words, a DPIA is a process for building and demonstrating 
compliance. 
As stated, conducting DPIA may be necessary to show that the processing of the personal 
data, and measures taken for such processing, are compliant with the GDPR. Also, if DPIA 
was not conducted when it should have been, or was conducted improperly, this may lead to 
monetary fines, in this case up to 10 M€, or up to 2% of the global yearly turnover, whichever 
is higher. However, it is not always mandatory to conduct DPIA for every processing 
operation: it is required only when the processing is “likely to result in high risk to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons”. But regardless, the obligation to “appropriately manage 
the risks for the rights and freedoms” remains. Effectively, this means that the risks, at the 
very least, need to be identified, analyzed, and evaluated. The risks should also be 
“reviewed regularly”. 
It is expected that the EDPB will issue guidelines, recommendations, and best practices in 
order to have a consistent approach and application of the GDPR. Furthermore, EDPB, in 
the future, should issue further clarifications, including examples, how to conduct DPIA and 
for which processing operations, and whether the relevant supervisory authority should be 
consulted. Similarly, jurisprudence will have to be developed. Yet only little of such guidance 
is currently available that is of direct relevance to research and collaboration infrastructures. 
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The following schematic, taken 
from the WP29 Opinion 
referred to above, serves to 
indicate the basic decision 
process related to the DPIA in 
the context of the GDPR. 
The first stage in deciding 
whether to conduct a DPIA is 
identifying the risks. If there 
are no high risks (and one can 
reasonably substantiate it), the 
organisation (so the 
Infrastructure, FIM Proxy, or 
Community) is does not need 
to conduct a formal DPIA. 
If the risks are “likely to be 
high”, and none of exceptions listed in Articles 35 apply (they don’t for our purposes, unless 
the EDBP or member state law were to grant an explicit exception to Infrastructures!), then a 
DPIA must be conducted. In assessing the risks: 
 any existing public availability of the personal information should be considered.  
 in the process of conducting a DPIA, the  DPO of the organisation conducting the 
assessment, if one exists, must be consulted. The view of the DPO may be ignored, 
but the reasons for such a decision must be documented.  
 the existence of and compliance with a Code of Conduct must be taken into account 
when assessing the impact of identified risks.  
 data subjects whose personal data are processed should be consulted “where 
appropriate”. However, the consent of data subjects for processing is not a way to 
seek their opinion on it (i.e. one cannot ‘abuse’ a consent button as a way of claiming 
that ‘the user was consulted’ and using that in the assessment to claim a lower risk).  
After assessing the risks, and collecting and incorporating all the inputs, the plan to mitigate 
the identified risks should be constructed. In cases where the identified risks cannot be 
sufficiently addressed by the data controller, the supervisory data protection authority must 
be consulted. 
There are ten criteria that, according to the WP29 Opinion, should be considered when 
deciding whether the DPIA is necessary. Does the processing involve: 
1. Evaluation or scoring, where examples include profiling, credit checks, building 
marketing profiles. 
2. Automated decisions with legal or similar effects, where processing may lead to 
discrimination or exclusion of individuals. 
Figure 1: DPIA assessment flow diagram from teh WP29 Opinion 248 
rev 1 
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3. Systematic monitoring, where processing includes monitoring of a “publicly 
accessible area” where the data subjects may not be aware who is and for which 
purpose they are collecting and processing personal data. 
4. Sensitive data of highly personal nature, where special personal data are processed, 
as defined in Article 9 of the GDPR (i.e. political opinions, health information, etc.). 
However, for some categories of data, while still deemed sensitive, their public 
availability may be taken into account when assessing the risk and using these data 
for certain purposes. 
5. Data processed on a large scale; the GDPR does not define what large-scale means, 
however WP29 mentions that factors that may be considered include the number of 
concerned data subjects, volume or range of items being processed, duration of 
processing, or the geographical extent of the processing activity. 
6. Matching or combining datasets, where initial processing has created data on which 
further processing would exceed the reasonable expectation of the data subjects. 
7. Data concerning vulnerable data subjects, where examples of such subjects are 
children, patients, employees, and similar. 
8. Innovative use or applying new technological or organisational solutions, for example 
where processing may be combining fingerprint with facial data i.e. whenever 
personal or societal consequences of processing may be unknown or high. 
9. Data transfer across borders outside the European Union, taking into consideration 
the country of destinations, possibility of future transfers or transfers based on 
derogations specified by the GDPR, among others. 
10. When processing prevents data subjects from exercising a right or using a service or 
a contract, where examples may be when banks screen customers against a credit 
reference to decide whether to grant a loan. 
The WP29 Opinion 248 (it was revised 
once, we consider rev1) states that, in 
most cases, when meeting two or more 
criteria the data controller should 
conduct a DPIA, regardless of the 
compensating measures the data 
controller plans to adopt. It goes 
further, stating that in some cases even 
meeting only one of these criteria may 
already require conducting a DPIA. And 
in all cases, this DPIA should then be 
an iterative process, and be reviewed 
periodically. The iterative process, as 
outlined in WP29 248.rev1 opinion, is 
shown in the graphic. 
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In addition, the GDPR itself sets out the minimum features of a DPIA (Article 35(7), and 
recitals 84 and 90). It should contain: 
 “a description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the 
processing”; 
 “an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing”; 
 “an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects”; 
 “the measures envisaged to: 
o “address the risks”; 
o “protect the data” 
o “demonstrate compliance with this Regulation”. 
The requirements outlined in the GDPR provide a generic, scalable framework for 
conducting a DPIA. And when assessing the risks one should consider them in relation to 
the “rights and freedoms of the natural persons”. In the recital 90, three processes are 
delineated: 
 establishing the context: “taking into account the nature, scope, context and 
purposes of the processing and the sources of the risk” 
 assessing the risks: “assess the particular likelihood and severity of the high risk” 
 treating the risks: “mitigating that risk, ensuring the protection of personal data and 
demonstrating compliance with this Regulation” 
As stated in the WP29.rev1 opinion: “A ‘risk’ is a scenario describing an event and its 
consequences, estimated in terms of severity and likelihood”. 
The practical implementation, but also the initial decision whether to conduct a DPIA, will 
depend on the actual circumstances and requirements.  
In the next chapter we will evaluate the risks that are present in the use case of research 
communities employing FIM. We will consider their impact, their likelihood, and which 
controls or mitigations can be employed to reduce or eliminate the risks, if necessary. 
 Risk assessment and DPIA impact on 
Community and Infrastructure Proxies 
The AARC Blueprint Architecture (BPA) provides a framework for research communities to 
organise federated identity and access management, and structure the provisioning of the 
access to resources and services within the community and generic e-Infrastructures. This 
specific framework provides sufficient commonality in the processing of personal data that a 
common risk assessment becomes feasible. We thus assess the risks for the Infrastructures 
involved within BPA use cases, evaluate the risks’ severity and likelihood, and provide 
generic guidance as to whether such risks are “likely  to result in high risk” for the data 
subjects. Furthermore, we will provide an overview of possible measures that, when 
undertaken appropriately, may lessen and mitigate the risks. Given that each research 
community and infrastructure is unique, no generic guidance can in itself be considered 
definitive (legal) advice, thus it must always be considered as an input to an organisational 
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decision. Yet we hope that it provides the appropriate hooks and references to significantly 
ease such a decision. 
4.1. Establishing the context 
Federated Identity Management (FIM) is an “arrangement that can be made among multiple 
organisations that let subscribers use the same identification data to obtain access to the 
secured resources of all organisations in the group” [FIM4R1]. Some obvious properties of 
FIM have inspired its use for Infrastructures and users (convenience and simplified user 
management among others), but additionally, and of specific interest when assessing risks, 
operating within FIM principles also provides for data minimisation and better data security 
over conventional methods. This is achieved by technical means (specific user attributes can 
be requested), by policy (definition of entity categories like Research and Scholarship that 
promote the use of just a few ‘low risk’ attributes like organisational email and the users’ own 
name), and in the AARC BPA by the scoping of attributes and user information to the 
community (in the community attribute authorities and Infrastructure proxies) and to only the 
involved service providers. It also has one other significant advantage: user credentials 
(passwords) are managed in a single trusted place (the user’s own home organisation), so 
that such sensitive information is not distributed throughout the services. It makes theft of 
such personal passwords much less of an issue - even when the user works in “dynamic 
collaborations that cross organisational and national boundaries”.  
The development and the progress 
in using FIM has led to the general 
acceptance of proxies, “to act as a 
mediator between identity providers 
and the services used by research 
disciplines”. This is also 
recommended by the AARC 
Blueprint Architecture (BPA) [BPA]. 
The general scheme of the BPA 
2016 is again shown graphically 
here for reference. 
In the guidance given here, we 
specifically consider the BPA model 
and the interposition of the proxy 
when accessing and using services 
- and limit ourselves to personal 
data collected as a result of users 
accessing (using) these services, 
including any accounting data collected. In the initial phase, we also limit ourselves to those 
cases where the use being made of the infrastructure is not a sensitive issue, i.e. for 
research where the freedoms of the researcher in itself are not at risk. More complex cases, 
which could occur in biological and medical research, need additional input from the 
research communities involved and have to be considered at a later time. 
Figure 2 AARC Blueprint Architecture 2017. This is the 
architectural model considered for the DPIA assessment process 
described. 
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4.2. Risk Assessment 
When talking about the risks, here we are assessing the risks for the users (or data subjects) 
accessing and using the resources. Although these risks are different than the risks of 
service providers, they could be considered together for situations when risks of one is 
influencing the other as in, for example, penetration of services may leak data that contain 
personal information of the users. However, in this document we will focus on the risks for 
the data subjects, and consider methods for minimisation and mitigation of such risks. These 
are the risks that the service provider (and Infrastructure) must weigh and consider - and 
possibly present to the user. 
Federated Identity Management and Federated Access Management (here taken together 
as “FIM”) is recognised by the regulators as a privacy enhancing tool [CORMACK]. With 
FIM, the information about the users is only released when accessing the service, and then 
only the necessary information required by the service is released. In general, the 
information contained in this use case is only the users’ email and name, and a non-
reassigned identifier (the “Research and Scholarship” attribute set). This scenario also 
benefit the organisations providing the services, or Service Providers (SPs), since it provides 
them with assurances on users’ information and allows SPs to identify and contact the user 
for problem resolution and user support. There are also trusted intermediaries involved in the 
scheme (either to just broker trust between the users’ home organisation and the service 
provider, or to convey and augment the access with community attributes and assurance 
statements), which can serve both to scope the flow of personal data and to provide 
community-based ‘pseudonymous’ identifiers. This set-up reduces the information collected 
and processed about the users, which is in line with the data minimisation benefits 
previously mentioned. 
The information that is processed, i.e. email and name (or identity), is considered Common 
Personal Data [CNIL-MAN]. Additional data that typically may be collected include 
Connection Data such as IP addresses, event logs, etc. These data, while still personal data, 
are not sensitive data such as biometric information or bank information, nor are they 
considered sensitive data as defined in the GDPR (Art 9). 
4.3. EDBP DPIA criteria 
In the BPA use cases - where data subjects’ data are being processed to provide them with 
access to services - in order to address whether a formal process of the DPIA is necessary 
we should consider the ten criteria outlined by the EDPB. For the research and collaboration 
scenario’s two of these stand out: cross-border transfer (beyond the EU, as research is 
global) and, potentially, data processed on a large scale. And although the EDPB as general 
guidance recommends that a formal DPIA be conducted when two or more criteria are met, 
it leaves it explicitly open to do a specific assessment and from that conclude that a DPIA 
may not be necessary. As per the GDPR, a DPIA is only necessary when processing is 
“likely to result in high risks”.  And such a decision can be substantiated by preliminary 
guidance provided by some of the more active national regulatory bodies that today provide 
guidelines for DPIAs. 
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But before delving into these guidelines we briefly consider the other criteria and their 
applicability to the research communities using FIM: Evaluation or scoring is typically not 
used for providing access to users, nor systematic monitoring, especially in the sense 
described by the EDPB. Sensitive data are also not processed, since it is not necessary to 
provide a service. Sensitive data are processed in some research communities, however 
that is outside the scope of the AARC BPA and the Infrastructure itself (communities that 
perform such processing will be well aware of their own need for a DPIA, e.g. for research 
on criminology, or personalised medicine, and like domains), nor is it the processing 
scenario we are considering. Innovative use or applying technological or organisation 
solutions are not necessary, and therefore not used, for the use case we’re describing (this 
e.g. refers to machine learning and AI techniques - FIM is not ‘innovative’ but rather 
‘standard’). Also, the information collected is the minimal set in order to provide a service 
and the used technological solutions (like SAML [SAML], OIDC [OIDC], and X.509 [PKIX]) 
are industry standards. The remaining criteria are even less applicable. 
Before assessing the severity and likelihood of the risks, and therefore providing an estimate 
of the risk levels (i.e. whether it will be “high” or not), we first consider the controls on 
proportionality and the necessity of processing - and any controls protecting data subjects'  
rights - and show examples on how they are addressed in our FIM and AARC BPA scenario. 
Proportionality and necessity of processing 
 Purpose: specified, explicit, and legitimate - In our case the purpose is to provide 
access to resources, as defined by version 2 (draft) of the GÉANT Data Protection 
Code of Conduct [DPCoCo] 
 Basis: lawfulness of processing, prohibition of misuse - Under GDPR, conditions for 
consent are strengthened, and access to resources in the FIM environment is 
typically done for professional reasons. Therefore, legitimate interest as a legal basis 
is the logical choice, since, as stated by WP29, it aims for a “balanced approach, 
which ensures the necessary flexibility for data controllers for situations where there 
is no undue impact on data subjects, while at the same time providing sufficient legal 
certainty and guarantees to data subjects that this open-ended provision will not be 
misused” [WP29-217] 
 Data minimisation: adequate, relevant and limited - As mentioned, under REFEDS 
“Research and Scholarship” and AARC recommendations only email and name are 
collected. Further information may be collected on a need basis, but additional 
information is typically about the assurances of the identity (i.e. how certain is that 
the user is who says it is, affiliation, etc.) or “freshness” of the information. This data 
is still considered Common personal data, and therefore not sensitive. The 
community attributes (group information, service access rights) are assigned to the 
user, necessary for the purpose of granting access, and not in themselves revealing 
information. 
 Quality of data: accurate and kept up-to-date - In the FIM scenario, data is typically 
released upon each access to services. Furthermore, by policy under the GEANT DP 
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CoCo, service providers give the ability for the users to update or remove their 
information, if necessary and required to do so.  
 Storage periods: limited - Personal data is usually removed after certain periods of 
time (typical interval is 6-18 months) - and Infrastructures adhering to GEANT 
DPCoCo as  well as those part of the European e-Infrastructures, make this explicit 
in their policy frameworks. 
Controls protecting data subjects' rights 
 Information for data subjects - SPs (and specifically also Communities and 
Infrastructure Proxies on their behalf, for reasons of usability and scalability) provide 
a Privacy Policy to users’ on their first access to services. In the policy, it is explained 
how their data are being processed. 
 Rights to rectification and erasure - If the users are no longer accessing services, 
their data is usually removed after certain periods of time. Furthermore, in the Privacy 
Policy is typically listed a contact for the users to address this issue. 
 Transfers - For transferring the data outside of EU, SPs have several methods to 
use, and current effort for the new DP CoCo is also addressing this issue. 
Types of outcomes arising from risks scenarios occurring are 
 Illegitimate access to personal data - where outcomes could range from none, i.e. 
data is not used, to some actual use (regulators give examples such as spamming, 
etc.) 
 Unwanted modification of personal data - where the outcome is a result of 
malfunction, i.e. data not used properly, and use (i.e. misuse) of data 
 Disappearance of personal data - where the outcome is a malfunction, i.e. resulting 
in errors or malfunctions in using the service, and blockage, i.e. resulting in service 
not being accessible anymore 
In FIM, all three scenarios are possible, however their impact depends on their severity and 
likelihood, which are jointly an input to the estimation of the risk levels. Severity is defined as 
a consequence or a magnitude of risk. Its estimate is influenced by a nature of the potential 
impact, i.e. nature of data, data subjects, purpose of risks [CNIL-METH], etc. Likelihood 
express the possibility of a risk occurring.  
Severity 
Although in its early stages, the most extensive source of information on risk assessment, in 
particular also considering the collaborative use cases and the context of accessing shared 
resources, is the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), the French 
Data Protection Authority. In its “PIA Knowledge Bases” white paper [CNIL-KB], the following 
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risks are explicitly listed as ‘negligible’ or ‘limited’, in terms of both material1 and moral2 
impacts. 
Negligible: 
 Loss of time in repeating 
 Spam emails 
 Targeted advertising 
 Mere annoyance caused by information received or requested 
 Feeling of losing control of one’s data 
 Feeling of invasion of privacy without real or objective harm (e.g. commercial 
intrusion) 
 Loss of time in configuring one’s data 
Limited: 
 Unanticipated payments, additional costs (e.g. bank charges) 
 Denial of access to administrative or commercial services  
 Lost opportunities of comfort (termination of an online account) 
 Minor but objective psychological ailments (defamation) 
 Feeling of invasion of privacy without irreversible damage 
 Intimidation on social networks 
The level of severity may be raised or lowered by including the following factors: 
 Level of identification of personal data 
 Nature of risk sources 
 Number of interconnections (especially with foreign sites) 
 Number of recipients (which facilitates the correlation between originally separated 
personal data) 
Although more severe risks most certainly do exists, they do not apply to the FIM and 
Infrastructure use cases that must be taken into consideration here. 
So in the FIM scenario, we should consider several of the negligible or limited impact 
scenarios as possible and concrete risks. As previously mentioned, types of data in the 
considered FIM scenario are emails, names, and IP logs. When considering the severity of 
risks, we can identify that the risks reach at most ‘limited impact’ (denial of access to 
commercial services), and in the majority of cases are likely ‘negligible’ (receiving spam 
emails, annoyance, fear of lost or invasion of privacy without real harm). Even though the 
considered FIM use case is by its nature distributed and international, there is no prima facie 
reason to assume that merely because of this scope the severity level should significantly 
increase. And regardless, the FIM use case is still preferable to the non-federated 
alternative, since, for example, in a scenario in which a single service may experience a data 
breach where personal data may be compromised, due to the nature of data (i.e. emails, 
                                               
1 From CNIL: “Loss incurred or lost revenue with respect to an individual's assets” 
2 From CNIL: “Physical or emotional suffering, disfigurement or loss of amenity.” 
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names) and the FIM’s distributed nature and size (i.e. research communities are typically not 
very large; not all users access all services), the impact is still substantially lower than in the 
scenario where a large, centralized commercial service provider would experience a data 
breach (in which case the user base may be considerably larger, and data may include more 
sensitive data such as service passwords, bank or credit card information). Especially given 
the acknowledged fact that users tend to re-use the same credentials for many (if not all) 
services, not having credential (password) data distributed across the Infrastructure is a very 
significant advantage of FIM, making a data breach of a research service provider much less 
severe. 
Likelihood 
Likelihood represents the feasibility of a risk to occur, and the scale, taken from CNIL, is 
ranging from ‘negligible’, meaning that the considered risk source does not seem possible to 
materialize the threat, to ‘maximum’, where it is very easy to materialize the threat. Again, 
the level can be subsequently raised or lowered by the following factors: 
 open to the Internet or it being a closed system 
 data exchanges with foreign countries (or not) 
 interconnections with other systems or no interconnection 
 heterogeneity or homogeneity of the system 
 variability or stability of the system 
 the organization’s image 
In summary, the following table, provided by CNIL, can serve as a useful template to capture 
the identified threats and their level of impact. Even when not conducting the formal DPIA, 
this table may offer guidance for research communities in documenting their risk assessment 
and risk mitigation strategies, to further demonstrate compliance with the GDPR. 
Risks Impacts 
on data 
subjects 
Main risk 
sources 
Main 
threats 
Existing 
or 
planned 
measures 
Severity Likelihood 
Illegitimate 
access to 
personal data 
      
Unwanted 
change of data 
      
Disappearance 
of data 
      
 
4.4. Risk Mitigation 
Based on the considerations above, and on the guidance from the French regulator, it is 
appropriate to infer that – even if data are processed on a large scale and cross national 
boundaries beyond the EU (something that is made explicit to the user and is actually much 
expected and appreciated) – the processing of personal data as a result of using the 
Infrastructure is unlikely to be high. 
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However, even though as a result there is no obvious requirement to conduct a formal DPIA 
in the FIM scenario research communities is, GDPR still mandates that identified risks and 
their mitigation should be considered. We already mentioned certain good practices in 
regards to the proportionality and necessity of processing, and controls protecting personal 
data. We will elaborate on these controls further, and provide recommendations and best 
practices to further lower the risks for users. This will strengthen the position of the 
Infrastructure and the service providers in explaining and demonstrating GDPR compliance. 
Addressing risks to the rights of the data subjects is related to many different aspects of 
information security management, including e.g. also physical security of services. This 
potential issue is recognised by the research communities and consultations are ongoing in 
addressing them. For example, the WISE community [WISE] issued guidance on addressing 
security risks [WISE-RISK] and continuously revises and improves it to address newly 
identified risks. Furthermore, the joint community effort including e-Infrastructures, 
communities, and the R&E federation operators in REFEDS [REFEDS] produced the 
Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity (Sirtfi) [SIRTFI], which 
aims to enable the coordination of incident response across federated organisations. Sirtfi 
facilitates sharing of data for incident response purposes, in itself an effort specifically 
endorsed by the EDPB [WP29-262]. REFEDS Research and Scholarship (R&S) [REFEDS-
RS] aims for the minimal release of information while still providing enough information to 
access services. The Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated 
Infrastructures (Snctfi) is a scheme to facilitate trust in the “proxied” environment promoted 
by the AARC BPA [SNCTFI]. Compliance ensures that services behind the proxy are 
following necessary security and privacy best practices. The AARC project, in cooperation 
with wider community and the e-Infrastructures in EOSC-Hub, is engaged in an ongoing 
effort to produce a comprehensive set of rules and documents (a “policy development kit”) to 
help communities operate their services in compliance with all the mentioned frameworks. 
In estimating risks for the formal DPIA, also existing Codes of conduct should be taken into 
account. The GÉANT Data Protection Code of Conduct (DPCoCo) version 2 is an effort by 
community to ease the implementation of and expression of adherence to the requirements 
of the EU Data Protection Directive and of the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) in federated identity management, specifically also enabling the exchange of 
personal data outside the EU. The Data protection Code of Conduct defines behavioural 
rules for services that want to receive users’ data, specifies the purpose of processing (i.e. 
access to resources), and the measures to protect such data. It addresses the necessary 
controls for protecting data and proportionality and necessity of processing. Furthermore, it 
requests the potential “abiders” to follow best security and operational practices. 
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 Summary 
Providing and accessing services using Federated Identity Management (FIM) poses some 
risks for the rights of data subjects because of the wide scope of collaboration and its 
inherent global and cross-national aspects. In this report we analyse the risks in the context 
of the AARC Blueprint Architecture (BPA) model and the Infrastructure Proxy, and - 
leveraging the FIM technical mechanisms and the policy guidance for communities and 
Infrastructures - place these in the context of the General Data Protection Regulation and 
the “Data Protection Impact Assessment” identified therein as a risk assessment 
mechanism.  
Based on the regulatory guidance available and the inherent safeguards built into the FIM 
model or service access, we show that significant aspects of GDPR compliance are already 
satisfied, specifically in data minimisation, reduction of the spread of personal data (and 
critical elements like credentials and passwords), and data security. Adherence to 
community best practices, limiting data to that based on REFEDS Research and 
Scholarship, and by implementation of the GEANT Data Protection Code of Conduct, Sirtfi, 
and the use of the Snctfi policy framework to ensure coherent behaviour of services ‘behind’ 
the BPA Community and Infrastructure Proxies, significantly mitigates any residual risk. 
We argue that the mentioned best practices, with documented and enforced procedures, 
significantly reduce the risks for the data subjects. As a result, in many cases it is unlikely 
that a DPIA will be needed for data gathered as a result of using the Infrastructure itself. Of 
course, the risk assessment for the research data itself (which is outside the scope of the 
AAI) may well warrant such an assessment if it concerns e.g. personal medical data, 
criminological data, or in the special cases where the fact of doing research in itself could 
expose researchers to risk (e.g. for research which in parts of society or media is not so well 
received). 
Still, potential risks may still remain in specific cases. Communities and Infrastructures can 
use this guidance document to inspire and guide their implementation, acknowledging that 
generic document such as this one cannot be construed as legal advice in any particular 
jurisdiction. 
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